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Abstract: In chapter 3 of the very welcome and enjoyable Roads to 
Reference, “Proper Names and Referential Indeterminacy”, Mario 
Gómez Torrente proposes a set of conventions establishing merely 
sufficient conditions for the fixation and transmission of the 
reference of proper names. There are some aspects of the 
undoubtedly very original and rigorous proposal that have 






Gómez Torrente opposes his proposal to an account 
based on necessary and sufficient conditions, such as the 
ones advanced by Devitt (2015) and Dickie (2011). He 
considers those accounts to be either too demanding or too 
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loose, and, basically, to give the wrong results in so-called 
cases of indeterminacy. My point is that the generalizations 
put forward by those theories could be interpreted along the 
lines of ceteris paribus laws. According to the Normal 
Conditions Approach to such laws, a ceteris paribus law holds 
when normal conditions obtain, namely, only if the situation, 
without disturbing factors, is a normal or a rather probable 
situation (Spohn 2002). The general idea behind this 
approach is that “Ceteris paribus, all As are Bs” means that 
normally As are Bs. Following this idea, one can think that the 
conventions establishing necessary and sufficient conditions 
for reference apply only in normal situations. Without intending 
to go deep into the different conceptions of normality1, I 
want to suggest that what Gómez Torrente presents as cases 
of indeterminacy can be considered to be abnormal cases, and 
as such they are not governed (and should not be expected 
to be governed) by the conventions contained in the 
generalizations. In other words, in as far as abnormal cases 
involve peculiar situations, excluded by ceteris paribus clauses, 
they must be accounted for independently of the 
conventions stating necessary and sufficient conditions for 
reference, presumably in accordance with other principles 
and commitments of the overarching theory that one 
defends. Gómez Torrente (2019) claims that “such theories 
[those stating necessary and sufficient conditions] will not 
provide an account of the difference between cases where 
reference fails determinately, as a matter of what reference-
fixing conventions determinately imply, and cases where no 
reference is determined, but merely because reference-fixing 
conventions fail to produce any relevant implication at all” 
(page 18). My present point is that the former cases are the only ones 
meant to be covered by the theories at stake, whereas the latter are 
                                                 
1 The normality condition can be explained in different terms, such 
as high probability or degrees of belief. 
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abnormal cases, regarding which a decision must be taken on grounds 
of the adoption of some independent theoretical commitments. So, it is 
not clear to me why his proposal, positing merely sufficient 
conditions, should be preferred to an account in terms of 
both necessary and sufficient conditions with ceteris paribus 
clauses. In fact, Gómez Torrente claims that he means his 
account to encompass that kind of clauses:  
 
It is also important to note, as in the case of 
demonstratives, that the conventions we are 
about to state must be understood as only 
roughly sufficient, as they involve conditions 
that are only sufficient ceteris paribus, in an 
appropriate sense. That they are ceteris paribus 
means in this case that the conditions are 
conventionally taken as sufficient merely 
under the assumption that the situation 
where the conditions apply is otherwise 
normal, that is, not unlike other situations 
when the conditions were accepted as 
applying in the past. (page 23) 
 
Well, the same claim can be made concerning both 
necessary and sufficient conditions: the corresponding 
conventions are taken to apply ceteris paribus, namely, if the 
situation involved is otherwise normal.   
On any causal account derived from Kripke (1980)’s 
seminal suggestions, reference borrowing plays a crucial role, 
since it is the mechanism by virtue of which the 
communication chain (be it a designational or a denotational 
one in Devitt (2015)’s  terms) is constituted. As is known, a 
basic condition on reference borrowing is that the name 
should be used with the same referential intention of the 
person from whom it is borrowed (as attested by Gómez 
Torrente’s own proposal of Successful name transmission). Now, 
with this in mind, the example of George Smith can be 
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clearly classified as an abnormal case, since the teacher does 
not have the intention to use the name to refer to his 
neighbor, as it would happen to any normal case of insertion, 
by reference borrowing, in a communication chain leading 
to the neighbor; the case can be assimilated to the use of a 
random or invented name.2  
The examples involving conflicting referential intentions, 
such as the use of  ‘Madagascar’ by Marco Polo, the Barnes 
example, the Carny example and the Tim example, allow for 
a similar analysis: given that the corresponding situation is 
abnormal, the conventions stating necessary and sufficient 
conditions for reference do not apply, and the explanation 
of what is going on has to be more cumbersome and may be 
open for discussion, since it involves taking a stance 
regarding either some meta-semantic aspects (such as the 
definition of the concept of grounding) or some independent 
ontological and epistemological commitments (such as a 
particular way of carving up reality, or the inclusion of 
clairvoyance as a form of perceptual knowledge).  
For instance, to take Devitt & Sterelny (1987)’s point of 
view, ‘Madagascar’ in Marco Polo’s mouth is taken to refer 
to an island by virtue of a multiple grounding process that 
takes on board his innovative uses —but this may allow for 
                                                 
2  What about those cases in which, for instance, a person 
successfully refers to Aristotle by taking part in a communication 
chain including some uses of the name that are not grounded in 
the philosopher, namely, uses that seem not to meet the necessary 
and sufficient conditions for the transmission of reference stated 
by the theory? I think that those are typical cases of mistakes: when 
someone sees Plato at a distance and then produces a token of 
‘Aristotle’, I would say it is an abnormal use, grounded in Plato by 
an understandably mistaken perceptual belief, but without 
consequences for the semantic convention grounding ‘Aristotle’ in 
Aristotle. 
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some uses of ‘Madagascar’ to be indeterminate, let’s say, 
when the situation is not the normal one because the name 
has not still acquired its referent.3 The same holds of the 
Barnes example: it is a very strange situation in which 
Barnes’s token of ‘Nora’ seems to involve a baptism, not an 
insertion in an already existing communication chain —the 
new name is grounded in an hallucinatory image, so, it would 
be at most a case of the introduction of a name without a 
referent. In the Tim example, the speaker is in the grip of 
another kind of mistake, which causes his introduction of 
‘Tim’ to be grounded in two different trees, unbeknownst to 
him. Did he fail to refer or did he succeed in referring to 
some object? The answer may depend on our ontological 
commitment; for instance, one may think that he succeeded 
in referring to a tree-fusion constituted by the combination 
of his two perceptual states.  
The example of the clairvoyant who baptizes a dog she 
cannot perceive through the external senses is also outside 
normality, since clairvoyance is not a generally acknowledged 
source of knowledge: necessary and sufficient conditions, 
defined for normal situations, do not straightforwardly 
apply. It all depends on whether one agrees that some names 
can be grounded in objects by means of extra-sensorial 
perception or not, which is something clearly debatable. Why 
should one think that necessary and sufficient conditions 
established for standard cases of perception and description 
apply to this kind of cases?  
In sum, my point is that the generalizations of any 
standard theory about the fixation and transmission of 
reference have to be interpreted ceteris paribus, namely, they 
cannot be supposed to encompass abnormal cases where the 
decision whether someone succeeds in referring to an object 
                                                 
3 See in particular page 63 of Devitt & Sterelny (1987), where they 
put forward the notion of partial reference. 
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or not will depend on some semantic-independent 
theoretical commitments. In other terms, they specify 
conditions of successful reference fixation and transmission 
for normal cases. Moreover, I do not think that those 
abnormal cases are intrinsically indeterminate: they are 
complicated, but it may be possible to elicit a determinate 
answer if more theory, mostly extra-semantic theory, is 
brought to the fore —of course, the acceptability of the 
answer will depend on the scientific credentials of the theory 
at stake: for instance, if it legitimizes clairvoyance or extra-






According to Gómez Torrente’s proposal, a speaker must 
know the reference fixing and transmitting conventions to be 
competent with proper names; the knowledge in question 
need not be full knowledge, though, which means that the 
competent speaker must be somehow familiar with them. In his 
own words:  
 
[…] being linguistic conventions that are 
relied upon by the linguistic community at 
large, the conventions we are after must 
plausibly be in some sense familiar to normal 
competent speakers, as we have conceded to 
the descriptivist. However, unlike the 
descriptivist, we don’t require full knowability 
of the conventions as such, but merely that 
the ability to observe them should be manifested in 
the linguistic behavior of speakers, and specifically 
in behavior that it should not be 
unreasonable to think of as behavior that 
normal speakers do perform. The relevant 
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kind of behavior may simply involve the 
acceptance or denial that particular objects 
are being talked about with specific uses of 
names. (pages 21-22, my emphasis) 
 
Gómez Torrente considers his position to be a minor 
concession to the descriptivist, namely, a concession that 
does not turn the account into a descriptivist one. My current 
point is that the intermediate position that he wants to 
defend is not a stable one. Since Gómez Torrente is not very specific 
about the kind of knowledge involved (what he means exactly by not 
being “knowledge in the full sense”), it is not clear to me, first of all, if 
he takes it to be practical or propositional, and second, whether he 
regards it as properly semantic or not. 
Is the knowledge of the relevant conventions that he 
takes to be constitutive of a speaker’s competence with 
names just a kind of practical knowledge, namely, something 
that is part of her practice or ability to use names 
competently, or is it a piece of propositional knowledge 
backing up that practice or ability? Our author claims that 
“the typical competent speaker can only be expected to 
recognize particular instances of application of the 
conventions” (page 22), but, again, it is not clear to me what 
kind of epistemic capacity is involved in that expectation. 
Moreover, if it were propositional knowledge, would it be 
knowledge of general conventions regarding names as a kind of 
expression, or knowledge of a specific convention concerning 
each particular name? In the former case, I think the thesis 
could be accepted by any anti-descriptivist, or Millian, 
theorist: nobody would deny that being a member of a 
linguistic community involves being able to perform naming 
and predicative practices as much as being able to tell them 
apart from each other. But an anti-descriptivist would reject 
the claim that being competent with a name consists in 
having propositional knowledge about the specific 
conditions, whatever they are, under which it applies to an 
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object. Moreover, an anti-descriptivist may agree that a 
competent speaker usually has some information about the 
conventions for using names, either general or specific, while 
rejecting that it is information constitutive of her specifically 
semantic competence.  
In fact, concerning the last point, Gómez Torrente claims 
that the knowledge at stake is “semantic in a broad sense”:  
 
I myself suspect that there are two notions 
of semantic competence underlying this 
discussion, closely related to the two senses 
of “meaning” that (following Kaplan) we 
distinguished in chapters 1 and 2: a 
restrictive notion of semantic competence, 
which involves knowledge of facts about 
semantic content in the sense of information 
semantically expressed by expressions or 
expression-uses, possibly understood as 
truth-conditional content; and a more 
encompassing notion of semantic 
competence about both aspects of semantic 
content and about “foundational” aspects, 
which involves knowledge of more facts 
concerning linguistic conventions bearing 
on semantic content, though still facts 
whose knowledge is required of the normal 
speaker for her to count as competent in a 
sufficiently broad intuitive sense. (page 9) 
 
But I find this terminology confusing: a descriptivist would 
consider the knowledge of the naming convention associated 
with a name plainly semantic, without any need to introduce 
a broader notion of  semantic competence, whereas an anti-
descriptivist or Millian would take that knowledge to be 
clearly non-semantic (be it pre-semantic, syntactic, 
pragmatic, common-sense, or any other non-semantic 
option she may come up with).  
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From my perspective, and setting aside the dispute 
between descriptivists and anti-descriptivists, it is important 
to be clear on the specific kind of knowledge, if any at all, 
that is in play. As is known, a competent speaker can be 
ascribed different kinds of linguistic abilities (syntactic, 
semantic, pragmatic), which may be exercised almost 
simultaneously but are clearly distinct. Suppose that 
someone claims that the ability to derive a conversational 
implicature, being tightly associated with the ability to 
understand the literal meaning of an expression, is semantic 
“in a broad sense”, or that the information conveyed by a 
conversational implicature is part of the meaning of the 
expression “in a broad sense”. Be that as it may, in the strict 
sense of these words, that is not the case: the ability and the 
information at stake are both pragmatic. Likewise, I think it 
is important to be clear on whether the information about 
the conventions for introducing and transmitting a name, 
which can be tightly associated with its competent use, is 
semantic or not in the strict sense of the word.  
Moreover, it should be noticed that bringing the case of 
demonstratives to the fore does not help in clarifying the 
point, since in the case of demonstratives there is no dispute 
concerning the semantic role of the corresponding 
conventions: in Kaplanian terms, there is no doubt that 
demonstratives have characters, but… what about names?4 
There is no explicit argument in Gómez Torrente’s chapter 
to the effect that the relevant conventions associated with 





                                                 
4 See, for instance, Kaplan’s own doubts concerning this possibility 
in footnote 71 of Kaplan (1989). 
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The last point I would like to make is more a question 
than a criticism, and it points to a specific topic, the analysis 
of fictional discourse, that Gómez Torrente has not explicitly 
included in the book, so that I would like to now how he 
might want to expand his proposal so as to address it. As it 
stands, the proposed conventions do not seem to straightforwardly 
account for the introduction and transmission of fictional names.  
On the one hand, the introduction of fictional names 
cannot be governed, for obvious reasons, by Successful 
explicit/implicit name introduction via perceptual intention, since 
fictional entities, if there were such things, could not be 
perceived. Moreover, what is more important, Successful 
explicit/implicit name introduction via description, replicated below 
for the sake of clarity, could apply only on the assumption 
that fictional names refer to fictional entities of some kind 
—non-existent, merely possible or abstract ones—, in which 
they would be grounded by means of using descriptions that 
they uniquely satisfy: 
 
Successful explicit/implicit name introduction via 
description: If a speaker S forms the 
explicit/implicit intention of using a name N 
that she introduces to refer to the object, if 
any, that uniquely satisfies a certain property 
F, and it turns out that there is such a unique 
satisfier of F, then N as used by S will refer 
to the F, if S forms no intention conflicting 
with that intention and if S does not form 
intentions about how to use N that on the 
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whole conflict with the intentions of the 
community of users of N at large.5 
 
That would involve giving fictional names a treatment similar 
to the analysis of Arabic numerals developed in chapter 4. 
But it would be a complicated path to take, since it 
encompasses a substantive ontological commitment. 
On the other hand, Successful name adoption via description, as 
in the quote below, 
 
Successful name adoption via description: if a 
speaker S forms the (explicit or implicit) 
intention of using a name N that she has 
inherited to refer to the object, if any, that 
uniquely satisfies a certain property F, and it 
turns out that there is such a unique satisfier 
of F, then N as used by S will refer to the F, 
if S forms no intention conflicting with that 
intention, and if S does not form intentions 
about how to use N that on the whole 
conflict with the intentions of the 
community of users of N at large. (page 26) 
 
could account for the transmission of fictional names, on the 
same previously mentioned assumption concerning the 
metaphysical status of fictional entities. But, again, Gómez 
Torrente may not want to be ontologically committed to the 
existence of fictional entities of any kind, in which a different 
convention should be put forward. Therefore, I would like 
to finish these brief remarks with a question: what kind of 
account of fictional discourse would Gómez Torrente be 
                                                 
5  I have put together the two different conventions given for 
explicit and implicit introductions, specified in pages 23 and 24 of 
the book. 
  Walking the Roads to Reference 33 
Manuscrito – Rev. Int. Fil. Campinas, v. 43, n. 4, pp. 22-34, Oct.-Dec. 2020. 
willing to endorse, or would he take to fit better with his 
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